Mate Choice Mechanism for Solving a Quasi-Dilemma

Tatsuyoshi Saijo () and Junyi Shen

No SDES-2017-22, Working Papers from Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management

Abstract: Saijo, Okano, and Yamakawa (2015) showed that the mate choice mechanism for a symmetric prisoner's dilemma (PD) game implements cooperation in backward elimination of weakly dominated strategies (BEWDS), and it attained almost full cooperation in their experiment. This study theoretically shows, first, that this mechanism works well in the class of quasi-dilemma (QD) games, such as asymmetric PD games and coordination games. Second, the class of BEWDS-implementable games is exactly the same as the class of QD games. Third, the mechanism cannot implement cooperation in a subgame perfect equilibrium. Finally, we confirm that the mate choice mechanism works well experimentally for an asymmetric PD game.

Keywords: Asymmetric prisoner's dilemma; Quasi-dilemma; Mate choice mechanism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 D74 P43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2017-10, Revised 2017-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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Published in SDE Series, October 2017, pages 1-22

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.souken.kochi-tech.ac.jp/seido/wp/SDES-2017-22.pdf First version, 2017 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Mate choice mechanism for solving a quasi-dilemma (2018)
Working Paper: Mate Choice Mechanism for Solving a Quasi-Dilemma (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kch:wpaper:sdes-2017-22

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