Common-Pool Resources are Intrinsically Unstable

Tatsuyoshi Saijo (), Jun Feng and Yutaka Kobayashi
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Yutaka Kobayashi: Research Center for Future Design, Kochi University of Technology

No SDES-2017-5, Working Papers from Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management

Abstract: Efficient allocations in common-pool resources cannot be accomplished when appropriators are selfish. In addition, we find that a system of a common-pool resource is locally unstable if there are four or more appropriators. Such instability most likely makes efficiency worse than that in the Nash equilibrium. These results indicate that equilibrium analyses might not capture the essence of the common-pool resource problem. They may also provide an answer to the unexplained pulsing behavior among appropriators and inefficiency observed in experiments.

Keywords: instability; Nash equilibrium; common-pool resources; pulsing behavior; appropriation problem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 C72 C92 Q22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 43 pages
Date: 2017-05, Revised 2017-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dcm and nep-env
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Published in SDE Series, May 2017, pages 1-43

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http://www.souken.kochi-tech.ac.jp/seido/wp/SDES-2017-5.pdf First version, 2017 (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kch:wpaper:sdes-2017-5

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