Nash Implementation in Production Economies with Unequal Skills: A Characterization
Naoki Yoshihara () and
Akira Yamada ()
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Akira Yamada: Sapporo University
No SDES-2018-18, Working Papers from Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management
The present study examines production economies with unequal labor skills, where the planner is ignorant of the set of feasible allocations in advance of production. In particular, we characterize Nash implementation by canonical mechanisms by means of Maskin monotonicity and a new axiom, non-manipulability of unused skills (NUS), where the latter represents a weak independence property with respect to changes in skills. Following these characterizations, we show that some Maskin monotonic social choice correspondences are not implementable if information about individual skills is absent.
Keywords: Unequal labor skills; Nash implementation; Canonical mechanisms; Non-manipulability of unused skills (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D51 D78 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2018-12, Revised 2018-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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Published in SDE Series, December 2018, pages 1-20
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http://www.souken.kochi-tech.ac.jp/seido/wp/SDES-2018-18.pdf First version, 2018 (application/pdf)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kch:wpaper:sdes-2018-18
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