Stakeholder Incentives and Reforms in China’s State-Owned Enterprises: A Common-Property Theory

Richard Cornes, Todd Sandler and Jon Cauley

Keele Department of Economics Discussion Papers (1995-2001) from Department of Economics, Keele University

Date: 1998
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Published in China Economic Review, Vol. 10, 1999, pages 191-206.

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Journal Article: Stakeholder incentives and reforms in China's state-owned enterprises: A common-property theory (1999)
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