Innovation, Licensing and Welfare

Arijit Mukherjee

No KERP 2002/03, Keele Economics Research Papers from Centre for Economic Research, Keele University

Abstract: This paper examines how the option for licensing affects research and development (R&D) and social welfare.We find that if cost reduction from R&D is sufficiently small and there is an option of licensing, firms will do non-cooperative R&D. In absence of licensing, firms will do cooperative R&D for sufficiently small cost reduction from R&D. Whether the option for licensing increases social welfare is ambiguous. If the possibility of licensing increases probability of success in R&D significantly then welfare is higher in presence of licensing.

Keywords: Cooperative R&D; Licensing; Welfare (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 O34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2002-02
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Published in The Manchester School, Vol. 73, 2005 pages 29-39. [ doi:10.1111/j.1467-9957.2005.00422.x ]

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Related works:
Journal Article: INNOVATION, LICENSING AND WELFARE* (2005)
Working Paper: Innovation, Licensing and Welfare (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kee:kerpuk:2002/03

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