Aggregative Public Good Games

Roger Hartley and Richard Cornes

No KERP 2003/05, Keele Economics Research Papers from Centre for Economic Research, Keele University

Abstract: We exploit the aggregative structure of the public good model to provide a simple analysis of the voluntary contribution game. In contrast to the best response function approach, ours avoids the proliferation of dimensions as the number of players is increased, and can readily analyse games involving many heterogeneous players.We demonstrate the approach at work on the standard pure public economic model and show how it can analyse extensions of the basic model.

Keywords: Noncooperative games; public goods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2003-10
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Forthcoming in Journal of Public Economic Theory

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Related works:
Journal Article: Aggregative Public Good Games (2007)
Working Paper: Aggregative Public Goods Games (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kee:kerpuk:2003/05

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