On the Core of a Market for Indivisible Commodities with Middlemen

Takayuki Oishi
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Takayuki Oishi: Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University

No 2008-017, Keio/Kyoto Joint Global COE Discussion Paper Series from Keio/Kyoto Joint Global COE Program

Abstract: This study provides sufficient conditions for non-emptiness of the core of a market for indivisible commodities with middlemen. This market is formulated as a three-sided assignment game without sidepayments. Our conditions are characterized by special properties of three-sided assignment games respectively and these conditions are equivalent to the balancedness condition(Scarf, 1967).

Pages: 12 pages
Date: 2008
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kei:dpaper:2008-017

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