On Auctions within a Ring of Collusive Bidders

Takayuki Oishi
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Takayuki Oishi: Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University

No 2008-019, Keio/Kyoto Joint Global COE Discussion Paper Series from Keio/Kyoto Joint Global COE Program

Abstract: Rings of collusive bidders at an English auction frequently distribute collusive gains among ring members via sequences of knockouts. This paper presents a model of sequences of knockouts. I investigate the relationship between the distributive outcome of each sequence and each solution of bidding ring games. I show that each sequence of knockouts yields an element of the core. In particular, a sequence of knockouts with the finest nested rings yields the Shapley value. Also, a sequence of knockouts at each of which a ring can guarantee its advantage for itself yields the nucleolus.

Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2008
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kei:dpaper:2008-019

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