Amakudari: The Post-Retirement Employment of Elite Bureaucrats in Japan

Tetsuro Mizoguchi and Nguyen Van Quyen
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Tetsuro Mizoguchi: Faculty of Economics, Keio University
Nguyen Van Quyen: Department of Economics, University of Ottawa

No 2009-011, Keio/Kyoto Joint Global COE Discussion Paper Series from Keio/Kyoto Joint Global COE Program

Abstract: This paper analyzes the amakudari practice in Japan. Amakudari refers to situations where government agencies contact the private firms that they regulate, asking them to provide employment for their retiring elite bureaucrats. Upon employment at the private firms, bureaucrats may collude with their former employers to secure lucrative government contracts, avoid regulatory inspections, or obtain preferential treatment. This paper provides an explicit formalization of the implicit collusion between the regulator and the regulated.

Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2009
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kei:dpaper:2009-011

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