A Note on the α- and β-Cores in TU Coalitional Strategic Games

Yu Chaowen and Mikio Nakayama
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Yu Chaowen: Graduate School of Economics, Keio University
Mikio Nakayama: Department of Economics, Keio University

No 2011-002, Keio/Kyoto Joint Global COE Discussion Paper Series from Keio/Kyoto Joint Global COE Program

Abstract: We show that the dominant punishment strategy and coalitionally dominant strategy applied to TU coalitional strategic games give directly the saddle point expression for the coalitional aggregate payoff function, which is the condition for the equivalence of the strategic cores α and β. Also, we find that the existence of a saddle point together with the concavity of payoff functions is not sufficient for nonemptiness of the β-core.

Pages: 5 pages
Date: 2011
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kei:dpaper:2011-002

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