Political Selection Tournament and Environmental Policy in China

Eiji Sawada and Xu Yirui
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Eiji Sawada: Waseda Research Institute for Science and Engineering
Xu Yirui: Kaetsu University Faculty of Management and Economics

No 2014-001, Keio-IES Discussion Paper Series from Institute for Economics Studies, Keio University

Abstract: As a means to give local governments a strong incentive for economic development, Chinese government has been used "political selection tournament." This control resulted in encouraging economic growth on one hand; it still remains some arguments about converting to green growth in China. We therefore examined that point by analytical approach using the framework of "elimination tournament model" proposed by Rosen (1986). We found that putting much weight on environmental improving as a promotion criterion does not always make local governments eager to address the improvement of natural environment. We also found that such a situation can be avoided by combining budget control with personnel control.

Keywords: Elimination tournament; personnel control; budget control; veto power; Green growth in China (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H11 H7 Q50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2014-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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