Firms and Regional Favoritism

Tien Vu and Hiroyuki Yamada
Additional contact information
Tien Vu: Asian Growth Research Institute

No 2017-025, Keio-IES Discussion Paper Series from Institute for Economics Studies, Keio University

Abstract: We examine formal firm behavior in response to regional favoritism by top-ranked politicians using a balanced panel of 444 rural districts (yearly observations) in Vietnam during 2000 to 2011 and census microdata of firms, politicians' home towns, and climate and population microdata. The study finds that the number of firms and aggregated employment of firms increase in the home town districts of politicians after they resume office. The findings suggest that regional favoritism in a single-party system maintains the continuous development of firms in politicians' home town districts and widens the gaps among rural districts.

Keywords: Firms; Favoritism; Politician; Vietnam (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D22 H72 R11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-sea
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Firms and regional favouritism (2021)
Working Paper: Firms and Regional Favoritism (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:keo:dpaper:2017-025

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