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A Game Theory-based Verification of Social Norms:An Example from Accounting Rules

Eiko Arata, Takuhei Shimogawa and Takehiro Inohara
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Eiko Arata: Faculty of Business and Commerce, Keio University
Takuhei Shimogawa: Faculty of Economics, Musashi University
Takehiro Inohara: Institute for Liberal Arts, Tokyo Institute Technology

No 2022-007, Keio-IES Discussion Paper Series from Institute for Economics Studies, Keio University

Abstract: This study develops a model that explains why accounting standards, known as Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, are "generally accepted". We focus on depreciation, for which multiple accounting procedures are permitted, and examine the reasons and conditions for acceptance of these procedures with cooperative game theory. Cost allocations given by the straight-line method, which is conventionally used all over the world, are always in the core. On the other hand, cost allocations given by the fair value measurement, which has been recently supported by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), are in the core if the market value of the asset predicted by the lease company realizes and the firm (lessee) can obtain the information of the realized value. Furthermore, we examined the relationship between methods adopted in practice and solution concepts that give unique solutions, such as the Shapley value and the nucleolus. Seeking the original solution concept of accounting standards is our next step.

Keywords: Depreciation; Cooperative game theory; Accounting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 M41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 2022-05-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc and nep-gth
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Handle: RePEc:keo:dpaper:2022-007