Collective Sanction Enforcement: New Experimental Evidence from Two Societies
Smriti Sharma and
Additional contact information
Smriti Sharma: Business School, Newcastle University
Matthew Walker: Business School, Newcastle University
No 2023-014, Keio-IES Discussion Paper Series from Institute for Economics Studies, Keio University
Sanction enforcement offers the potential to mitigate free riding on punishment among multiple third parties. Cross-societal differences in the effectiveness of sanction enforcement may be explained by factors rooted in cultural evolution. This paper provides the first experiment to study third-party enforcement of punishment norms with and without opportunities for higher-order punishment by selecting two different societies in terms of the degree of ancestral kinship ties: India and the United Kingdom. In both societies, third parties strongly inflict punishment when they encounter a norm violation, and a third party's failure to punish the norm violator invites higher-order punishment from their fellow third parties. These behavioral patterns are consistent with a model of social preferences and literature from anthropology and theoretical biology. On the other hand, two clear cross-societal variation emerges. First, third-party enforcement is stronger in the UK than in India. Parallel to this behavioral pattern, a supplementary survey also validates the conjecture that people in a society with looser ancestral kinship ties (the UK) are relatively more willing to engage in pro-social punishment. Second, intriguingly, the group size effect varies across the two societies: whereas third parties free ride on others' punitive acts in the UK, they punish more when in the presence of other third parties in India.
Keywords: Experiment; Cross-societal variation; Public Goods; Third-party punishment; Higher-order (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D01 D91 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 88 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-law and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:keo:dpaper:2023-014
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Keio-IES Discussion Paper Series from Institute for Economics Studies, Keio University Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Institute for Economics Studies, Keio University ().