Endogenous product compatibility choice under Cournot competition with a network externality
Tsuyoshi Toshimitsu
No 115, Discussion Paper Series from School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University
Abstract:
We provide a simple model of endogenous product compatibility choice under Cournot competition with a network externality. Using the model, we consider how the degree of a network externality and product substitutability affects the choice regarding product compatibility. In particular, if the degree of the network externality is larger than that of the product substitutability, there exist multiple equilibria, involving imperfect, partial, and perfect compatibility. However, if another assumption formula regarding a spillover effect, which is a component of network size, is made, i.e., the converter case, there is a unique equilibrium, i.e., perfect compatibility, irrespective of the degree of the network effect versus product substitutability. Furthermore, we show that a perfectly compatible product standard is socially optimal and analyze, therefore, whether a social dilemma arises in the network products market.
Keywords: product compatibility, network externality, fulfilled expectation; Cournot duopoly, horizontally differentiated product (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 D43 D62 L15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 2014-01, Revised 2014-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-mic and nep-net
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kgu:wpaper:115
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