INFORMED PLANNER, DECENTRALIZED DECISIONS AND INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY

Manimay Sengupta
Additional contact information
Manimay Sengupta: School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University

No 12, Discussion Paper Series from School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University

Abstract: The results on the design of incentive compatible mechanisms for implementing public decisions establish that there is no general solution to the incentive problem if the mechanisms are required to be informationally decentralized. However, even when the planner possesses the knowledge of the agents' characteristics, he may need to reach these decisions through a decentralized decision mechanism, in which the agents act in accordance with their incentives to select the public decision. Thus, even within a complete information model with an informed planner, one may need to find mechanisms that implement public decisions via decentralized decisions of the agents. We show that there exists a mechanism which resolves this problem.

Pages: 30 pages
Date: 1996-10, Revised 1996-10
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://192.218.163.163/RePEc/pdf/kgdp12.pdf First version, 1996 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kgu:wpaper:12

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Paper Series from School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Toshihiro Okada ().