International Environmental Agreement and the Timing of Domestic Lobbying

Etienne Farvaque and Norimichi Matsueda

No 165, Discussion Paper Series from School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University

Abstract: We incorporate domestic lobbying activities into a policymaker's decision making on whether or not to sign a cooperative bilateral environmental agreement and, if not, how much pollution a country emits. There are environmental and industrial lobbyists who attempt to sway the policymaker's decision toward their respectively favored policies. As is usually the case with a common agency model, lobbyists present contribution schedules that are tied to resulting policy choices. In this article, we focus on the impacts of the timing of lobbying activities. The first type of lobbying occurs on the signing of a cooperative agreement, and the second when each nation chooses its own non-cooperative emission level after the agreement was not signed or one of the signatories has reneged on its promise. We compare the outcomes of the four different cases: (i) no lobbying activity; (ii) lobbying conducted at the agreement signing stage; (iii) lobbying conducted when non-cooperative choice is made; and (iv) lobbying at both occasions. Our results suggest that the different timings of domestic lobbying have quite contrasting impacts on the signing of a cooperative agreement, and also that increasing the number of lobbying opportunities can even contribute to the emergence of international cooperation.

Keywords: common agency; compensating equilibrium; environmental agreement; global pollution; lobbying (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2017-08, Revised 2019-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-ene, nep-env and nep-law
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://192.218.163.163/RePEc/pdf/kgdp165.pdf Second version, 2019 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kgu:wpaper:165

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Paper Series from School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Toshihiro Okada ().