Note on the Excess Entry Theorem in the Presence of Network Externalities

Tsuyoshi Toshimitsu

No 195, Discussion Paper Series from School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University

Abstract: We reconsider the excess entry theorem in the presence of network externalities under Cournot oligopoly. We demonstrate that if the strength of a network externality is larger (smaller) than a half, the number of firms under free entry is socially too small (too large), based on the second-best criteria.

Keywords: Cournot oligopoly; free entry; excess entry theorem; network externality; a fulfilled equilibrium; passive expectations; responsive expectations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 D43 D62 L15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 11 pages
Date: 2019-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-com, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-ore
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http://192.218.163.163/RePEc/pdf/kgdp195.pdf First version, 2019 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Note on the excess entry theorem in the presence of network externalities (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kgu:wpaper:195

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