An endogenous timing analysis of international duopoly with transboundary stock pollution

Kenji Fujiwara () and Norimichi Matsueda

No 31, Discussion Paper Series from School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University

Abstract: This paper looks into potential determinants of the mode of international competition in a polluting good market by analyzing a so-called timing game between two environmentally concerned governments. From the equilibrium results of our intergovernmental game based on an international duopoly model with transboundary stock pollution, we show how an exact form of international competition depends on the magnitudes of international transportation coefficients of pollutant emissions and decay rates of pollutant stocks in respective countries as well as on other environmental and economic variables.

Keywords: international duopoly; transboundary pollution; stock pollution; gains from trade; endogenous timing. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F10 F12 Q20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2007-04, Revised 2007-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene, nep-env and nep-int
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http://192.218.163.163/RePEc/pdf/kgdp31.pdf First version, 2007 (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kgu:wpaper:31

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