Herding, Social Preferences and (Non-) Conformity
Luca Corazzini () and
Ben Greiner ()
No 21, Working Paper Series in Economics from University of Cologne, Department of Economics
We study the role of social preferences and conformity in explaining herding behavior in anonymous risky environments. In an experiment similar to information cascade settings, but with no private information, we find no evidence for conformity. On the contrary, we observe a significant amount of non-conforming behavior, which cannot be attributed to errors.
Keywords: herding; information cascades; conformity; non-conformity; laboratory experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D31 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-11-16, Revised 2007-01-24
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe and nep-exp
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Forthcoming Economics Letters
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Journal Article: Herding, social preferences and (non-)conformity (2007)
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