Overcoming Incentive Constraints? The (In-)effectiveness of Social Interaction

Dirk Engelmann and Veronika Grimm ()

No 22, Working Paper Series in Economics from University of Cologne, Department of Economics

Abstract: We experimentally study behavior in a simple voting game where players have private information about their preferences. With random matching, subjects overwhelmingly follow the dominant strategy to exaggerate their preferences. Applying the linking mechanism suggested by Jackson and Sonnenschein (2005) captures nearly all achievable efficiency gains. Repeated interaction leads to significant gains in truthful representation and efficiency only if players can choose their partners.

Keywords: Experimental Economics; Mechanism Design; Implementation; Linking; Bayesian Equilibrium; Efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A13 C72 C91 C92 D64 D72 D80 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-02-28
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-pol and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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