Sequential versus Bundle Auctions for Recurring Procurement

Veronika Grimm ()

No 27, Working Paper Series in Economics from University of Cologne, Department of Economics

Abstract: We compare sequential and bundle procurement auctions in a framework of successive procurement situations, where current success positively or negatively affects future market opportunities. We find that in bundle auctions procurement cost is lower and less risky than in sequential standard auctions, but still higher than in the optimal sequential auction. Only a sequential second price auction leads to the efficient outcome.

Keywords: Sequential auctions; bundling; stochastic scale effects; procurement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D92 H57 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-06-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Sequential versus Bundle Auctions for Recurring Procurement (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kls:series:0027

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