Tempting Righteous Citizens? On the Counterintuitive Effects of Increasing Sanctions

Tim Friehe

No 2011-09, Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz from Department of Economics, University of Konstanz

Abstract: This paper demonstrates that increasing the expected sanctions for a crime may increase this crime's prevalence, using a principal-agent model with different crimes. The intuition is that the policy change may increase the principal's expected payoff from crime by decreasing the information rent required by the agent.

Keywords: Crime; principal-agent relation; information rent (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H23 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 9 pages
Date: 2011-05-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-law
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.uni-konstanz.de/FuF/wiwi/workingpaperseries/WP_Friehe-9-11.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:knz:dpteco:1109

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://www.wiwi.uni-konstanz.de/en

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz from Department of Economics, University of Konstanz Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Office Ursprung ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).