Optimal Contracting with Reciprocal Agents in a Competitive Search Model
Maria Breitwieser ()
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Maria Breitwieser: Department of Economics, GSDS, University of Konstanz, Germany
No 2015-16, Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz from Department of Economics, University of Konstanz
Abstract:
The presented paper offers a simple search model of the labor market to explain the empirical findings on the role of reciprocity for labor market outcomes as reported by Dohmen et al. (2009). In an agency setting where profit-maximizing firms compete for heterogeneous reciprocal workers, with full information about workers’ types, reciprocal workers who are willing to engage in gift exchange are approached by more firms, get higher wages and exert higher efforts than selfish workers.
Keywords: reciprocity; gift exchange; competitive search equilibrium; optimal contracts; wage differentials; unemployment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D03 D21 E24 J31 J64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 12 pages
Date: 2015-07-28
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-hrm, nep-mac and nep-ore
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:knz:dpteco:1516
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