EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Insurgency and Small Wars: Estimation of Unobserved Coalition Structures

Francesco Trebbi and Eric Weese

No 1628, Discussion Papers from Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University

Abstract: Insurgency and guerrilla warfare impose enormous socio-economic costs and often persist for decades. The opacity of such forms of conflict is often an obstacle to effective international humanitarian intervention and development programs. To shed light on the internal organization of otherwise unknown insurgent groups, this paper proposes two methodologies for the detection of unobserved coalitions of militant factions in conflict areas, and studies their main determinants. Our approach is parsimonious and based on daily geocoded incident-level data on insurgent attacks alone. We provide applications to the Afghan conflict during the 2004-2009 period and to Pakistan during the 2008- 2011 period, identifying systematically different coalition structures. Further applications are discussed.

Pages: 80 pages
Date: 2016-09
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.econ.kobe-u.ac.jp/RePEc/koe/wpaper/2016/1628.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: Insurgency and Small Wars: Estimation of Unobserved Coalition Structures (2019) Downloads
Working Paper: Insurgency and small Wars: Estimation of Unobserved Coalition Structures (2016) Downloads
Working Paper: Insurgency and Small Wars: Estimation of Unobserved Coalition Structures (2016) Downloads
Working Paper: Insurgency and Small Wars: Estimation of Unobserved Coalition Structures (2015) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:koe:wpaper:1628

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers from Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Kimiaki Shirahama ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).

 
Page updated 2025-04-01
Handle: RePEc:koe:wpaper:1628