Personalized Pricing with Upstream Corporate Social Responsibility and Downstream Investment

Ryo Masuyama ()
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Ryo Masuyama: Kushiro Public University of Economics and Kobe University

No 2607, Discussion Papers from Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University

Abstract: This study evaluates personalized pricing in supply chain competition. We consider two supply chains, each comprising an upstream firm with Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and a downstream firm investing in quality. A downstream firm's quality investment has two effects: it raises its own consumers' utility and induces the rival downstream firm to lower its price, consequently benefiting the rival's consumers. As personalized pricing is exploitative, the former effect is entirely captured. First, we find that under personalized pricing, a downstream firm's investment benefits only the rival's consumers. In response, the upstream firm with CSR sets a higher input price to expand the rival's market share and increase consumer surplus, which weakens downstream investment incentives and moderates quality competition. Second, we find that personalized pricing may harm consumers while remaining profitable for downstream firms.

Keywords: personalized; pricingï¼›; uniform; pricingï¼›; Corporate; Social; Responsibilityï¼›; quality; investmentï¼›; supply; chain; management (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L10 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 2026-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-mac
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