Does US Aid Buy UN General Assembly Votes? A Disaggregated Analysis

Axel Dreher, Peter Nunnenkamp and Rainer Thiele

No 06-138, KOF Working papers from KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich

Abstract: Using panel data for 143 countries over the period 1973-2002, this paper empirically analyzes the influence of US aid on voting patterns in the UN General Assembly. We use disaggregated aid data to account for the fact that various forms of aid may differ in their ability to induce political support by recipients. We obtain strong evidence that US aid buys voting compliance in the Assembly. More specifically, our results suggest that general budget support and untied grants are the major aid categories by which recipients have been induced to vote in line with the United States. When replicating the analysis for other G7 donors, no comparable patterns emerge.

Keywords: Bilateral Aid; UN General Assembly; Voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 2006-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-afr and nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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http://dx.doi.org/10.3929/ethz-a-005187403 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Does US aid buy UN general assembly votes? A disaggregated analysis (2008)
Working Paper: Does US aid buy UN general assembly votes? A disaggregated analysis (2006)
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