Development Aid and International Politics: Does Membership on the UN Security Council Influence World Bank Decisions?

Axel Dreher, Jan-Egbert Sturm and James Vreeland

No 07-171, KOF Working papers from KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich

Abstract: We investigate whether temporary members of the UN Security Council receive favorable treatment from the World Bank, using panel data for 157 countries over the period 1970-2004. Our results indicate a robust positive relationship between temporary UN Security Council membership and the number of World Bank projects a country receives, even after accounting for economic and political factors, as well as regional and country effects. The size of World Bank loans, however, is not affected by UN Security Council membership.

Keywords: World Bank; UN Security Council; Voting; Aid (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 37 pages
Date: 2007-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dev, nep-his and nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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http://dx.doi.org/10.3929/ethz-a-005425741 (application/pdf)

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Journal Article: Development aid and international politics: Does membership on the UN Security Council influence World Bank decisions? (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kof:wpskof:07-171

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