Decentralization as a Disincentive for Transnational Terror?

Axel Dreher and Justina A. V. Fischer

No 08-185, KOF Working papers from KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich

Abstract: Using panel data for a maximum of 109 countries over the years 1976-2000, we empirically analyze the impact of decentralization on the occurrence of transnational terror. Taking account of the potential simultaneity between terror and decentralization, our results show that expenditure decentralization robustly reduces the number of terror events in a country, while political decentralization has no impact.

Keywords: Terrorism; Decentralization; Democracy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2008-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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