Agency and communicaton in IMF conditional lending: Theory and empirical evidence

Silvia Marchesi, Laura Sabani and Axel Dreher

No 09-218, KOF Working papers from KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich

Abstract: We focus on the role that the transmission of information between a multilateral (the IMF) and a country has for the optimal design of conditional reforms. Our model predicts that when agency problems are especially severe, and/or IMF information is valuable, a centralized control is indeed optimal. To the contrary, when local knowledge is more important than the agency bias we expect delegation to dominate. Controlling for economic and political factors, our empirical tests show that the number of IMF conditions is lower in countries with a greater social complexity, while it increases with the bias of the countries' authorities, openness, and transparency, consistently with the theory.

Keywords: IMF conditionality; delegation; communication; panel data (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 52 pages
Date: 2009-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta
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http://dx.doi.org/10.3929/ethz-a-005778388 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Agency and Communication in IMF Conditional Lending: Theory and Empirical Evidence (2009)
Working Paper: Agency and communication in IMF conditional lending: theory and empirical evidence (2009)
Working Paper: Agency and Communication in IMF Conditional Lending: Theory and Empirical Evidence (2009)
Working Paper: Agency and communication in IMF conditional lending: theory and empirical evidence (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kof:wpskof:09-218

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