On (Non-) Monotonicity of Cooperative Solutions
Yair Tauman () and
No 13, Discussion Papers from Kyiv School of Economics
Aggregate monotonicity of cooperative solutions is widely accepted as a desirable property, and examples where certain solution concepts (such as the nucleolus) violate this property are scarce and have no economic interpretation. We provide an example of a simple four-player game that points out at a class of economic contexts where aggregate monotonicity is not appealing.
Keywords: Cooperative games; aggregate monotonicity; axiomatic solution; core; Shapley value; nucleolus (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Date: 2009-01, Revised 2009-10
Note: Published in International Journal of Game Theory 39, 171-175 (2010)
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http://repec.kse.org.ua/pdf/KSE_dp13.pdf Revised version, October 2009 (application/pdf)
Journal Article: On (non-) monotonicity of cooperative solutions (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kse:dpaper:13
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