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Competing Auction Houses

Alexander Matros and Andriy Zapechelnyuk

No 17, Discussion Papers from Kyiv School of Economics

Abstract: We consider a model where sellers make repeated attempts to sell an object via two competing auction houses. An auction house that attracts a seller runs a Vickrey auction among a random sample of buyers and collects two fees: a listing fee and, if the object is sold, a closing fee. We characterize equilibria and show that two equilibrium outcomes are possible: a (contestable) monopoly, and a market segmentation between the two competitors.

Keywords: Competing auctions; mediator; listing fee; closing fee (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-04, Revised 2010-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cta, nep-gth and nep-mic
Note: Under review in Games and Economic Behavior
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Downloads: (external link) Revised version, March 2010 (application/pdf)

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