Better-Reply Dynamics with Bounded Recall
No 2, Discussion Papers from Kyiv School of Economics
A decision maker is engaged in a repeated interaction with Nature. The objective of the decision maker is to guarantee to himself the average payoff as large as the best-reply payoff to Nature's empirical distribution of play, no matter what Nature does. The decision maker with perfect recall can achieve this objective by a simple better-reply strategy. In this paper we demonstrate that the relationship between perfect recall and bounded recall is not straightforward: The decision maker with bounded recall may fail to achieve this objective, no matter how long recall he has and no matter what better-reply strategy he employs.
Keywords: Better-reply dynamics; regret; bounded recall; fictitious play; approachability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D81 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo and nep-gth
Date: 2008-01, Revised 2008-03
Note: Published in Mathematics of Operations Research, 33, 869-879 (2008)
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http://repec.kse.org.ua/pdf/KSE_dp2.pdf Revised version, March 2008 (application/pdf)
Journal Article: Better-Reply Dynamics with Bounded Recall (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kse:dpaper:2
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