On Uniform Conditions for the Existence of Mixed Strategy Equilibria
Pavlo Prokopovych and
Nicholas C. Yannelis ()
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Nicholas C. Yannelis: University of Iowa/ The University of Manchester
No 48, Discussion Papers from Kyiv School of Economics
Embarking from the concept of uniform payoff security (Monteiro P.K., Page F.H, J Econ Theory 134: 566-575, 2007), we introduce two other uniform conditions and then study the existence of mixed strategy Nash equilibria in games where the sum of the payoff functions is not necessarily upper semicontinuous.
Keywords: Discontinuous game; Diagonally transfer continuous game; Payoff secure game; Mixed strategy equilibrium; Transfer lower semicontinuity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C65 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
Note: Submitted to International Journal of Game Theory
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