Are Corporate Tax Burdens Racing to the Bottom in the European Union?
Signe Krogstrup
No 04-04, EPRU Working Paper Series from Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics
Abstract:
This paper tests the central predictions of the theoretical tax competition literature for capital tax rates for a panel of European Union countries, notably a race to the bottom in corporate tax burdens. In contrast to the previous empirical literature, empirical support for increasing capital mobility to be resulting in a reduction in corporate tax burdens is found. The results also suggest that other factors driving the corporate tax burden should not be neglected and may provide substantial counterweight to tax competition forces
Keywords: Tax competition; Capital taxation; Corporate tax burden; European financial integration; Capital mobility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F2 F36 H2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 43 pages
Date: 2004-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eec, nep-pbe and nep-pub
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22)
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