The deterrence effect of whistleblowing
Niels Johannesen and
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Tim Stolper: Department of Public Economics, University of Munich
EPRU Working Paper Series from Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics
We document that the first leak of customer information from a tax haven bank caused a signifficant decrease in the market value of Swiss banks known to be assisting with tax evasion and that the decrease was largest for the banks most strongly involved. These findings suggest that markets expected the leak to increase the perceived risk of committing and assisting with tax evasion and thus to lower both demand and supply in the market for criminal offshore banking services. This interpretation finds support in further evidence that the leak caused a sharp drop in foreign-owned deposits in tax havens.
Pages: 39 pages
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kud:epruwp:17-01
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