Public Choice of an Education System and its Implications for Growth and Income Distribution

Mark Gradstein and Moshe Justman

No 94-09, EPRU Working Paper Series from Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics

Abstract: In this paper we employ a simple overlapping generations model of growth to examine two extreme modes of government intervention in the provision of education: education subsidies for private provision and uniform public provision, both funded by a proportional income tax. Comparing them with regard to tehir impact on growth and income distribution, and their relative popularity, we find little conflict between democracy and growth in the choice of education system: the same factors that provide for political support for subsidization over public provision -- larger external benefits, a greater propensity to consume leisure, and less inequality -- also favor its relative growth performance.

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