Information Structure and the Tragedy of the Commons in Resource Extraction

Rabah Amir () and Niels Nannerup
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Niels Nannerup: University of Southern Denmark, Department of Economics

No 00-09, Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper considers the well-known Levhari-Mirman model of resource extraction, and investigates the effects of the information structure of the dynamic game - open-loop, Markovian or history-dependent - on the equilibrium consumption path and the overall utility of the agents. The open-loop regime yields a Pareto-optimal outcome. The Markovian regime leads to the most pronounced version of the tragedy of the commons. History-dependent behavior yields an outcome set that is intermediate between the other two cases.

Keywords: Dynamic resource games; Open-loop; Closed-loop and trigger strategies; Pareto optimality, Regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 Q20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2000-06
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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http://www.econ.ku.dk/english/research/publications/wp/2000/0009.pdf/ (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Information Structure and the Tragedy of the Commons in Resource Extraction (2006)
Working Paper: Information structure and the tragedy of the commons in resource extraction (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kud:kuiedp:0009

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