The Political Economy of International Emissions Trading Scheme Choice: Empirical Evidence

Jan Tjeerd Boom and Gert Svendsen
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Jan Tjeerd Boom: University of Copenhagen, Institute of Economics

No 00-19, Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics

Abstract: The Kyoto Protocol allows international emissions trading, which could take place in three different forms: government, permit, or credit trading. Which trading system is chosen is likely to depend on the preferences of several interest groups. In this paper, we give empirical evidence on the preferences of industry and environmental organizations for national environmental policy instrument and for international emissions trading scheme. Furthermore, we present data that gives an indication about the level of rent-seeking by these groups at the international level. The aim of this paper is to identify which instruments are politically most feasible.

Keywords: Emissions Trading; CO2; Kyoto; Public Choice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H41 Q25 Q28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 52 pages
Date: 2000-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe and nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kud:kuiedp:0019

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