Convergence to No Arbitrage Equilibria in Market Games

Leonidas C. Koutsougeras
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Leonidas C. Koutsougeras: University of Manchester

No 02-12, Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics

Abstract: For market games which feature multiple posts for each commodity we show the following: (i) the 'law of one price' obtains asymptotically as the number of market participants becomes infinite, irrespectively of the characteristics of market participants; (ii) as the number of markets increases the set of equilibria is nested upwards.

Keywords: multiple posts; arbitrage; law of one price (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D43 D50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2002-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ifn and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kud:kuiedp:0212

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