Communication between Public and Private Interests and the Europeanisation at the Regional Level
Jan Gunnarsson
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Jan Gunnarsson: Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen
No 02-14, Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics
Abstract:
This paper sheds light on the way in which sovereignty is transferred from the state to the sub-national level as a result of European integration. It poses the question whether communication links between public organizations and private companies could improve the 'bottom up' drive from the regional level in multi-level governance and thereby improve the legitimacy of the EU. The paper looks into this question by considering differences between countries with regard to institutions in domestic politics. Empirically, it investigates policies pursued by regional authorities with respect to public services to private companies and how these policies affiliate with the overall policies of EU-focused regional associations. Theoretically, it is argued that the establishment of a regional role in the EU can be explained by evolutionary theory of institutional change. The notion of 'output-based legitimacy' is applied to clarify the legitimising force of political actions channelled through industrial networks.
Keywords: multi-level governance; regional cross-border collaboration; linkages between public and private interests; legitimacy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H70 L50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2002-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-eec and nep-pbe
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kud:kuiedp:0214
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