Iterated weak dominance and subgame dominance

Lars Peter Østerdal

No 03-07, Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics

Abstract: In this paper, we consider finite normal form games satisfying transference of decisionmaker indifference. We show that any set of strategies surviving k rounds of elimination of some weakly dominated strategies can be reduced to a set of strategies equivalent to the set of strategies surviving k rounds of elimination of all weakly dominated strategies in every round by (at most k) further rounds of elimination of weakly dominated strategies. The result develops work by Gretlein (Dominance Elimination Procedures on Finite Alternative Games, Int J Game Theory 12, 107-113, 1983). We then consider applications and demonstrate how we may obtain a unified approach to the above mentioned work by Gretlein and recent work by Ewerhart (Iterated Weak Dominance in Strictly Competitive Games of Perfect Information, J Econ Theory 107, 474-482, 2002) and Marx and Swinkels (Order Independence for Iterated Weak Dominance, Games Econ Behav 18, 219-245, 1997).

Keywords: weak dominance; weak subgame dominance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 13 pages
Date: 2003-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-ind
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.econ.ku.dk/english/research/publications/wp/2003/0307.pdf/ (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Iterated weak dominance and subgame dominance (2005)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kud:kuiedp:0307

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics Oester Farimagsgade 5, Building 26, DK-1353 Copenhagen K., Denmark. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Hoffmann ().