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The Evolution of Conventions under Incomplete Information

Mogens Jensen, Birgitte Sloth () and Hans Jørgen Whitta-Jacobsen
Additional contact information
Mogens Jensen: Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen
Hans Jørgen Whitta-Jacobsen: Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen

No 03-12, Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics

Abstract: We formulate an evolutionary learning process with trembles for static games of incomplete information. For many games, if the amount of trembling is small, play will be in accordance with the games' (strict) Bayesian equilibria most of the time supporting the notion of Bayesian equilibrium. Often the process will select a specific equilibrium. We study an extension to incomplete information of the prototype conflict known as "Chicken" and find that the equilibrium selection by evolutionary learning may well be in favor of inefficient Bayesian equilibria where some types of players fail to coordinate.

JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2003-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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http://www.econ.ku.dk/english/research/publications/wp/2003/0312.pdf/ (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The evolution of conventions under incomplete information (2005) Downloads
Working Paper: The Evolution of Conventions under Incomplete Information (2000) Downloads
Working Paper: The evolution of conventions under incomplete information (2000) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kud:kuiedp:0312

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