On the Political Economy of Adverse Selection

Hervé Crès and Mich Tvede

No 05-14, Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics

Abstract: We consider a standard insurance economy where consumers are supposed to vote over menus of insurance contracts: A menu of contracts is majority stable if there does not exist another menu which is supported by an appropriate majority of consumers. We compute the smallest level of super majority for which there always exists a stable menu of contracts, and such that all stable menus of contracts are Pareto optimal. Lower super majority voting rules may ensure existence of stable menus if individual states and/or types of consumers are aggregated, but then stable menus of contracts need not be Pareto optimal: hence a trade-off between Pareto optimality and conservativeness of the voting rule is exhibited.

JEL-codes: D7 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 6 pages
Date: 2005-05, Revised 2006-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-pol
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.econ.ku.dk/english/research/publications/wp/2005/0514.pdf/
http://www.econ.ku.dk/english/research/publications/wp/2005/0514New.ed.pdf/ (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: On the political economy of adverse selection (2005)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kud:kuiedp:0514

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics Oester Farimagsgade 5, Building 26, DK-1353 Copenhagen K., Denmark. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Hoffmann ().