Pure Redistribution and the Provision of Public Goods

Rupert Sausgruber and Jean-Robert Tyran

No 06-24, Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics

Abstract: We study pure redistribution as a device to increase cooperation and efficiency in the provision of public goods. Experimental subjects play a two-stage game. The first stage is the standard linear public goods game. In the second stage, subjects can redistribute payoffs among other subjects in their group. We find that cooperation and efficiency increases substantially with this redistribution scheme, and that the redistribution option is popular. Our results provide an intuitive explanation for why an imposed redistribution rule, as proposed by Falkinger (1996), is capable of sustaining cooperation in the provision of public goods.

Keywords: experiment; public goods; redistribution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C9 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 7 pages
Date: 2006-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-pbe and nep-pub
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.econ.ku.dk/english/research/publications/wp/2006/0624.pdf/ (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Pure redistribution and the provision of public goods (2007)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kud:kuiedp:0624

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics Oester Farimagsgade 5, Building 26, DK-1353 Copenhagen K., Denmark. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Hoffmann ().