Self-Organization for Collective Action: An Experimental Study of Voting on Formal, Informal, and No Sanction Regimes

Thomas Markussen, Louis Putterman and Jean-Robert Tyran

No 11-04, Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics

Abstract: Entrusting the power to punish to a central authority is a hallmark of civilization. We study a collective action dilemma in which self-interest should produce a sub-optimal outcome absent sanctions for non-cooperation. We then test experimentally whether subjects make the theoretically optimal choice of a formal sanction scheme that costs less than the surplus it makes possible, or instead opt for the use of informal sanctions or no sanctions. Most groups adopt formal sanctions when they are of deterrent magnitude and cost a small fraction (10%) of the potential surplus. Contrary to the standard theoretical prediction, however, most groups choose informal sanctions when formal sanctions are more costly (40% of the surplus). Being adopted by voting appears to enhance the efficiency of both informal sanctions and non-deterrent formal sanctions.

Keywords: formal sanctions; informal sanctions; experiment; voting; cooperation; punishment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 C92 D03 D71 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 44 pages
Date: 2011-02
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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http://www.econ.ku.dk/english/research/publications/wp/dp_2011/1104.pdf/ (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Self-Organization for Collective Action: An Experimental Study of Voting on Formal, Informal, and No Sanction Regimes (2011)
Working Paper: Self-Organization for Collective Action: An Experimental Study of Voting on Formal, Informal, and No Sanction Regimes (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kud:kuiedp:1104

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