Inequality Aversion and Voting on Redistribution

Wolfgang Höchtl, Rupert Sausgruber and Jean-Robert Tyran
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Wolfgang Höchtl: University of Innsbruck

No 11-18, Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics

Abstract: Some people have a concern for a fair distribution of incomes while others do not. Does such a concern matter for majority voting on redistribution? Fairness preferences are relevant for redistribution outcomes only if fair-minded voters are pivotal. Pivotality, in turn, depends on the structure of income classes. We experimentally study voting on redistribution between two income classes and show that the effect of inequality aversion is asymmetric. Inequality aversion is more likely to matter if the “rich” are in majority. With a “poor” majority, we find that redistribution outcomes look as if all voters were exclusively motivated by self-interest.

Keywords: redistribution; self interest; inequality aversion; median voter; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A13 C9 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2011-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-ltv, nep-pol, nep-pub and nep-upt
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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http://www.econ.ku.dk/english/research/publications/wp/dp_2011/1118.pdf/ (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Inequality aversion and voting on redistribution (2012)
Working Paper: Inequality Aversion and Voting on Redistribution (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kud:kuiedp:1118

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