National Responses to Transnational Terrorism: Intelligence and Counterterrorism Provision
Thomas Jensen ()
No 12-22, Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics
Abstract:
Intelligence about transnational terrorist threats is generally gathered by national agencies. I set up and analyze a game theoretic model to study the implications of national intelligence gathering for the provision of domestic (defensive) counterterrorism when two countries are facing a transnational terrorist threat. It is shown that, relative to a benchmark case where all intelligence is commonly known, national intelligence gathering often leads to increased overprovision, although it can be the other way around. By extending the model with a com munication stage, I also explore the possibilities for intelligence sharing prior to decisions on counterterrorism provision. If verifiable sharing is a viable option for each country, there exists an equilibrium with full intelligence sharing. On the other hand, if only cheap talk communication is possible then full sharing cannot happen in equilibrium.
Keywords: Transnational Terrorism; Counterterrorism; Intelligence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D74 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2012-11-15
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kud:kuiedp:1222
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