A General Equilibrium Macro Model with Wage Bargaining

Hans Jørgen Jacobsen and Christian Schultz ()
Additional contact information
Hans Jørgen Jacobsen: Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen

No 87-05, Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics

Abstract: In a general equilibrium macro model with wage bargaining, agents are divided into capitalists and workers. The markets for produced goods and money are competitive, but the wage rate is determined by negotiation between an employers' union and a trade union. Unions are supposed to be "long sighted" and care about members' utilities in stationary states. Nash bargaining equilibria are characterized by unemployment for certain parameter values. This unemployment is persistent in the sense that it appears in an equilibrium with endogenous prices. A neutrality result for monetary policy is also shown.

Keywords: labour economics; theory of uncertainty and information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 1987-12
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in: Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 1990, 92(3) pp 379-98

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kud:kuiedp:8705

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics Oester Farimagsgade 5, Building 26, DK-1353 Copenhagen K., Denmark. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Hoffmann ().