Strongly Implementable Social Choice Correspondences

Peter Fristrup and Hans Keiding
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Hans Keiding: Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen

No 88-14, Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics

Abstract: A social choice correspondance is strongly implementable if there is a mechanism such that its strong Nash equilibrium outcomes coincide with the alternatives chosen by the social choice correspondance. It is known that a strongly implementable social choice correspondence is contained in the core correspondence of its associated effectivity function, and conversely Holzman (1987) introduced the nucleus correspondence which is in a certain sense minimal among the strongly implementable social choice correspondences. In the present paper, a new solution concept for games in effectivity function form, the supernucleus, is introduced. The supernucleus social choice correspondence is founded on strategic behaviour. It is less restrictive than the nucleus, and it is contained in the core. We show that the supernucleus correspondence is implementable and that it has a minimality property similar to that of the nucleus.

Keywords: asymmetric and private information; coalitions; equilibrium; social choice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
Date: 1988-11
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Published in: Social Choice and Welfare, 2001, 18(2) pp 213-226

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kud:kuiedp:8814

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